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This paper analyses the extent to which Georgia's pro-Western foreign policy orientation
stems from ideas and identity rather than from materialist and systemic factors alone.
Finding such narrow approaches insufﬁcient for explaining small state behavior, and
drawing on liberal and constructivist approaches to international relations theory, the article
argues that Georgia's foreign policy orientation has a strong basis in the widespread ideo-
logical perception amongst the local political elite that Georgia “belongs” in theWest. Based
on this theoretical framework, this paper provides a historical overview of Georgia's foreign
policy, tracing the evolution of Georgia's identity from seeing itself as “Christian” in contrast
to its Islamic neighbors, to identifying as European in contrast to a modern, Russian “other”.
As Georgia attempts to construct a collective international identity, the devotion to the idea
of Euro-Atlantic integration as a “sacred destiny” amongst the country's elite has signiﬁcant
foreign policy implications. This article overviews the current challenges and dilemmas of
self-identiﬁcation and investigates the roles that national identity and the prevailing “Eu-
ropean” identity play in Georgia's quest for “desovietization”.
Copyright © 2015, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Production and
hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The idea that ideology is a factor in foreign policy is
nothing new. Indeed, it has been said “that ideology has
played an important part in modern international relations
is generally taken for granted” (Fawn, 2006, p.7). There are
few places where this is more true than in the relatively
new states of the former Soviet Union. These states' pro-
pensity to internal crisis and ideological ﬂux combined
with the ongoing process of nation and state-building,
“have led to a powerful role of ideas, identity and sym-
bols” (Jones, 2004, p. 85) in this region. So it is therefore thehia), sminesashvili@
arch Center, Hanyang
nter, Hanyang University. Prodcase that structural and material theories of international
relations often prove insufﬁcient for explaining small
states' foreign policy behavior. Embracing the idea that
“foreign policy expresses not only what one wants, but also
what one is” (Fuller, 2007, p. 93), this article discusses
Georgia's foreign policy in the light of the politics of ideas
and identity.
Due to its long-term historical experience and common
cultural practices with multiple states and regions, Georgia
could potentially identify itself with a range of regions.
These include the post-Soviet space, the Caucasus or even
the Middle East. Georgia could equally have simply avoided
selecting a sole vector. However, disregarding all of these
options, Georgia focused on its European identity, which
became a major cultural focus of the political discourse
(Jones, 2004) that gradually emerged throughout the
country's troublesome history and constant struggle for
survival amidst various empires. European identity is alsouction and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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country's foreign policy priority for almost two decades
now.
In this context, the paper examines Georgia's foreign
policy through the prism of ideas and identity as major
drives of its orientation. It also aims to explore the mech-
anisms through which ideas and identity ﬁnd inﬂuence on
foreign policy decision-making and behavior. Referring to
concepts such as the liberal idea of ‘social order’ and the
constructivist approach to identity, this paper argues that a
state's foreign policy preferences can be traced to how the
society in question deﬁnes itself in relation to others. This
identity is in turn deﬁned in relation to social orders within
states. Therefore, states tend to deﬁne external allies and
enemies based on the perceived compatibility of their so-
cial orders.
The paper1 overviews theoretical propositions on the
role of identity in foreign policy and suggests an over-
arching framework. By applying existing theoretical ap-
proaches, this inquiry provides a historical review of
Georgia's identity formation and the dominant factors in its
construction. Consequently, it analyses the origins of
Georgia's “European” identity, which prevails in Georgian
foreign policy and test the efﬁcacy of an identity-based
approach vis-a-vis alternative explanations, thus demon-
strating the leading role of identity in foreign policy
orientation.2. Theoretical framework and methodology
The article places itself within a literature that refers to
factors such as social order and ideas in the analysis of
foreign policy choices by small states. For this purpose, this
inquiry explores aspects of liberal theory (Moravcsik, 1997;
Owen, 2011; Skidmore, 1997a, 1997b) that trace foreign
policy preferences to the character of a state's underlying
social orders and constructivism with its notion of ideas
and identity. Both of these approaches often refer to the
shortcomings of materialist theories, particularly in the
case of explaining the foreign policy alignment of small
states.
Neorealist approaches largely fall into the latter cate-
gory. In the case of weak states, balance of power theory
suggests that they will either exhibit balancing behavior
against the most powerful or joinwith the powerful statee
bandwagoning (Jervis& Snyder,1991; Kaufman,1992; Labs,
1992; Walt, 1987). Stephen Walt's (1987) revision of the
realist theory suggests that states balance not against the
most powerful, but against the most threatening and that
threat perceptions are impacted by geographic proximity,
offensive power and aggressive intentions. However, when
applied to the post-Soviet states, structural realism ﬁnds
little room for explaining some of the anomalies of both
bandwagoning and balancing (Miller, 2006; Wohlforth,
2004). Similarly, this approach fails to explain why1 This work was supported by Academic Swiss Caucasus Net (ASCN)
within the project “Role of Identity, Norms and Beliefs in Foreign Policy of
Armenia and Georgia”. The contents of this paper do not necessarily
reﬂect the views of ASCN.Georgia maintained its pro-Western foreign policy orien-
tation after the 2008 war with Russia when it became clear
that the West was not willing to play a balancing role
(Gvalia, Siroky, Lebanidze, & Iashvili, 2013). The logical
neorealist response to this situation would be to band-
wagon with Russia but this did not occur. Moreover, even
though in Walt's theory, purpose is considered along with
power, Walt still does not offer a compelling explanation as
to why a state can form antagonistic intentions towards
other states (Skidmore, 1997b, p. 232). Economic depen-
dence theory also fails to explain the Georgian case as
Georgia further distanced itself from Russia after the
imposition of an economic embargo in 2006 despite its
high economic dependence on its northern neighbor.
This paper argues that we need to look beyond systemic
factors to explain cases like this and look at the more
fundamental sources of foreign policy preferences. This is
where ideas in relation to state social orders start to matter.
A brief literature review reveals that the importance of
ideology and identity in foreign policy orientation has been
emphasized by many in the past.
For Moravcsik (1997), it is the conﬁguration of state
preferences that matters most in world politics rather than
the conﬁguration of capabilities as claimed by realism:
“societal ideas, interests and institutions inﬂuence state
behavior by shaping state preferences that is the funda-
mental social purposes underlying the strategic calcula-
tions of governments”. In the same vein, whilst discussing
various cases of regime promotion in the world, Owen
(2011) accords a major role to ideologies behind state in-
tentions. Rejecting approaches that merely concentrate on
material interests, he argues that state leaders promote
regimes based on the interests of speciﬁc ideologies thus
equating regime promotion to “ideological polarization”.
David Skidmore (1997a) uses the idea of social orders to
analyze foreign policy: “state behavior is a function of in-
terests and purposes generated by the broader social orders
in which states are embedded” (p. 3). Skidmore, rejects the
assumption that state preferences are solely conditioned by
inter-state competition but rather “socially constructed in a
ﬂuid environment” (p. 4). This makes the international
system a ﬁeld of competing social orders rather than states.
Interests and power are structured in the social order by
the following components: “political regimes (institutions),
dominant ideological systems (ideas) and structures of
economic production and distribution (socio-economic
interests)” (p. 4). In foreign policy, the degree of compati-
bility between social orders is what deﬁnes enmity and
friendship between states. Skidmore proposes that “con-
ﬂict stems ﬁrst and foremost from qualitative differences in
the purposes of such actors and in their visions of the
preferred domestic and international order” (1997b, p.
181).
Even though ideational liberalism stresses the impor-
tance of ideas in terms of state conﬂict and cooperation, it
does not trace their origins (Moravcsik, 1997). This is where
constructivism can further enrich our analysis of the effect
of identity-based preferences on foreign policy, more spe-
ciﬁcally through the idea of the self/other nexus. Based on
the proposition that “social threats are constructed, not
natural” (Wendt, 1999, p. 405), identity and perceived
3 For detailed account see: Haas, C. (2014). “Geopolitics and Georgian
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populations, which are in turn reﬂected in foreign policy
orientation and behavior. What a state perceives as its in-
terests depends “on a particular construction of self-
identity in relation to the conceived identity of others”
(Jepperson, Wendt, & Katzenstein, 1996, p. 60). In a similar
vein, Johnston (1995) argues that national identity is rele-
vant to foreign policy because it is constructed in the pro-
cess of identifying the “self” in contrast to the “other”.
Furthermore, Goldstein and Keohane (1993) exploring the
impact of ideas and beliefs on foreign policy, claimed that
“actions taken by human beings depend on the substantive
quality of available ideas, since such ideas help to clarify
principles and conceptions of causal relationships and to
coordinate individual behavior” (p. 5). This does not imply
that explanations based on ideas and material interests
cannot coexist but the opposite, that they are compatible in
the sense that “material interests matter but ideas deter-
mine how they matter” (Gvalia et al., 2013, p. 109). Simi-
larly, Fawn sees the link between security and identity
suggesting that “search for national identity coincides with
the search for security” (2006, p. 36).
Reconciling the social order approach with the ideas
that stem from identity as self/other nexus, is capable of
suggesting that other is deﬁned based on the perceived
incompatibility between social orders. On the other hand,
identiﬁcation of the self and a larger entity of belonging
stems from perceived compatible social orders. Ideas then
can inﬂuence policy and foreign policy among them in
several ways including how decision-makers frame and
describe a situation, ideas structure policy decision-making
process and inﬂuence the way results are interpreted
(Tannenwald, 2005, p. 17). Based on the above-mentioned
frame, we suggest that ideas on the self, other, perceived
threat from the other and proposed relations based on the
perceived compatibility of social orders inﬂuence foreign
policy choices.
In line with Nina Tannenwald's (2005) work, this article
is grounded in “soft positivism” whilst at the same time
taking account of constructivist approaches. To demon-
strate that ideas matter in the case of Georgia, this inquiry
refers to measures of continuity, which explain persistent
factors in the way the country interacts with other states.
Consistency of a stated goal, foreign policy orientation,
behavior or ideology in the context of congruence with
public opinion can suggest such continuity. This is un-
dertaken in contrast to alternative explanations. Consid-
ering the lack of awareness of the Georgian population
about European institutions (Muller, 2011), identity con-
struction is considered to be a top-down project, which is
the case in the majority of cases where states transition
towards a different model has presence (Lane, 2011).
Correspondingly, in our research, the main focus falls on
political elites2 and their ideas and identity. Georgian
foreign policy is also primarily considered to be elite-2 We use Gaetano Mosca's (1939) deﬁnition of political class here, who
refers to it as “the relatively small group of activists that is highly aware
and active in politics, and from whom the national leadership is largely
drawn”.driven and elites are assumed to be “more important
and instrumental in deﬁning foreign policy goals and
priorities compared to the general public” (Gvalia et al.,
2013, p. 31).
The paper also intends to explore the rationale
through which ideas and identity ﬁnd inroads into foreign
policy behavior. Based on the theoretical framework, it is
argued that it is ideas about the extent of social (in)
compatibility that inﬂuence how political leaderships
identify their “self” and “other” and thus deﬁne allies and
enemies. The article traces back the historical develop-
ment of Georgia's “Europeanness”, and uses the content
analysis method to analyze foreign policy documents of
the last two governments, speeches of their representa-
tives. Drawing upon original 20 in-depth interviews that
were conducted with major foreign policy decision-
makers from the last two governments of Georgia led
by the United National Movement (UNM) and the Geor-
gian Dream (GD) coalition it also provides elite percep-
tions regarding the same issue (see the Appendix for the
respondents' proﬁles).3. Ideas and identity as factors of state behavior and
emergence of “Europeanness”
Throughout many centuries of occupation and division,
as Georgia played a role of a buffer state between different
empires and invaders (Turmanidze, 2009), many aspects of
the country's foreign policy behavior or aspired orientation
reﬂected its evolving identity. Before Christianity, the
Kingdom of Kartli-Iberia, located in what is now Georgia,
was subject to the inﬂuences of both the ancient Greeks to
the west and the Persians to the East.3 During the ﬁrst
millennium, the Byzantine and Persian empires divided
Georgia between themselves; however, Georgia's estab-
lishment as a Christian state brought it closer to Byzantium
in terms of culture. As the Ottoman Empire captured Con-
stantinople in 1453 and sealed the Black Sea, Georgia was
cut off from Europe and the Christian world. Consequently,
Georgia's trade ties with theWest were severed resulting in
political and economic decline. The country turned into a
battleground for two rival powers e Safavid Persia and the
Ottoman Empire.4 Georgia found itself exclusively envel-
oped by Islamic powers.
Being an object of Muslim empires and dynasties, reli-
gion became the major marker of Georgian identity. Geor-
gia was “an outpost of Western Christendom in an Islamic
world”, therefore the Georgian as a “Christian, European
and warrior-martyr” was deﬁned vis-a-vis the Muslim
“other” (Jones, 2004, p. 91). Under the constraint of the
Persian and Ottoman empires, Georgia often looked for an
ally in Christian Europe. Sulkhan-Saba Orbeliani'sIdentity in Late Antiquity: The Dangerous World of Vakhtang Gorgasali”
in Georgian Christian Thought and Its Cultural Context. (Ed) Nutsubidze,
T.,Horn, C. B, Lourie, B. Koninklijke Brill publishing.
4 Details see: Metreveli, R. (1998). Essays on the history of Georgian
diplomacy. Tbilisi State University.Kʻartʻulisaxelmcipʻo da sax-
alxodiplomatiisistoriissamecʻniero- Kvlevitʻicʻentri.Tʻbilisisuniversitetis
gamomcʻemloba.
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France as the strongest country in Europe, the Georgian
king, Vakhtang IV, seeking a potential ally and protector
sent his envoy Orbeliani to appeal for assistance. Despite
his meetings with several leaders such as Ludwig XIV, Pope
Clement XI and Louis XIV, who even promised some help,
his journey was largely unsuccessful.5
Meanwhile, Russia emerged as a considerable power in
the region. Hoping that its Christian neighbor would pro-
tect Orthodox Georgia from Muslim domination, Georgian
leaders appealed to Russia.6 However, Russia's protection
turned out to mean the loss of Georgia's political inde-
pendence after the death of the last east Georgian king,
Giorgi XII, as the Kingdom of Kartl-Kakheti was incorpo-
rated in the Russian Empire without any autonomy. How-
ever, despite Russia's autocratic tradition, for Georgia it
remained a channel to Western ideas (albeit in a distorted
way) until the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 (Nodia, 2010,
p. 91).
Theway to theWest was through Russia and the ideas of
European thinkers were introduced to Georgia via educa-
tion in Russian centers of learning (Suny, 1994, p. 123). It
was in fact the Russian-educated young generation of
Georgians Tergdaleulni, who spurred the concept of Geor-
gian nationalism in 1860s after bringing European ideas
back home (Nodia, 2010, p. 86). However, Georgia's self-
identiﬁcation as western and the notion of a “return to
Europe” emerged in the beginning of the 20th century with
the Tsiperkhantselni, whowere educated inWestern Europe
(Brisku, 2009, p. 76). After the Bolshevik Revolution, Russia
lost its image as a source of enlightenment among the
Georgian social democratic leadership, who no longer saw
Russia as part of Europe and rather sought integration into
European political structures (Jones, 2004, p. 92). At this
time Georgia sought direct links with Europe and chose
social democracy and western-type of development
(Nodia, 2010, p. 94). This is when Russia began to be seen as
the “other” vis-a-vis belonging to Europe, which was
further reinforced by Georgia's forceful integration into the
Soviet Union,7 which was perceived as a barrier isolating it
from its historical destiny. In this context Europe was
perceived as “a pristine and symbolic antithesis to com-
munism's oriental backwardness”. This time instead of self-
identiﬁcation as Christian vis-a-vis the Muslim world,
Georgia perceived itself as European by rejecting commu-
nism (Jones, 2004, p. 88).5 See more: Silogava, V, Shengelia, K. (2007) History of Georgia: From
the Ancient Times Through the “Rose Revolution”. Caucasus University
Publishing House.
6 See: Avalov, Z. (1906) Prisoedinenie Gruzii k Rossii, Montvid, S.-
Peterburg. (Repr. New York: Chalidze Publications, 1981).
7 The Democratic Republic of Georgia, (1918e1921), was the ﬁrst
modern establishment of a Republic of Georgia. Proclaimed on May 26,
1918, on the break-up of the Transcaucasian Federation, it was led by the
Social Democratic Menshevik party. Facing permanent internal and
external problems, the young state was unable to withstand the invasion
by the Russian SFSR Red Armies, and collapsed between February and
March 1921 to become a Soviet republic. On this account see: Leon
Trotsky, Between Red and White. Social Democracy and wars of Inter-
vention. 1922. Available at: http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/
1922/red-white/index.htm.4. Georgia's foreign policy trajectory after
independence
After its declaration of independence from the Soviet
Union in 1991, Georgia embraced western values of liberal
democracy. However, with an inherited political culture
lacking in strong democratic tradition, an inexperienced
foreign policy elite, scarce ﬁnancial resources, and poorly
deﬁnedcompeting social forces, initiallyGeorgiawasunable
to develop a viable foreign and security policy towards the
West. The ﬁrst president Zviad Gamsakhurdia struggled to
develop meaningful diplomatic ties as important interna-
tional actors remained reluctant to recognize the country's
independence. President George H. W. Bush's speech in
August 1991 urging non-Russian Soviet republics to accept
Gorbachev's proposed union treaty (Matlock, 2005) is one
such example. However, the West was expected to support
the principles of international law and self-determination
(Fawn, 2006) and was perceived as “an embodiment of
fairness [which] by deﬁnition was obliged to support just
cases” (Nodia, 1998, p. 20). But Gamsakhurdia failed to craft
a viable foreign and security policy and pursued a rather
utopian pan-Caucasian project at the expense of Georgia's
silenced European identity (Jones, 2004, p. 88).
Foreign policy choices were restricted by internal con-
ﬂicts in the country. The next leader, Eduard Shevardnadze,
despite initial rejection of the idea, was forced to concede
inﬂuence to Russia through membership in the Common-
wealth of Independent States (CIS) in 1993 (Rondeli, 2001).
Shevardnadze's decision was inﬂuenced by his need to
strengthen his position in the struggle for power against
warlords and the ousted president as well as in ongoing
territorial conﬂicts (Baev, 1997).
However, once the situation was normalized in the
country, Georgia started looking towards the west again.
The second half of the 1990s saw the goal of western
integration become more prominent in Georgian political
discourse. This pro-Western ideology was most strongly
seen in the younger generation of reformists in the ruling
party e the Citizen's Union of Georgia (Beachain & Coene,
2014, p. 929). This process occurred parallel to the “other-
ing” of Russia which failed to contribute to conﬂict reso-
lution despite Georgia's concessions. The development of
relations with European structures including Georgia's
admission to the Council of Europe in 1999 were portrayed
as important steps on the way “back to Europe” (Beachain
& Coene, 2014, p. 929). This state of affairs was best
encapsulated by parliamentary chairman Zurab Zhvania's
words: “I am Georgian, therefore I am European”. In 1994,
Georgia joined NATO's Partnership for Peace Programe
(PfP) and in 1999 the PfP Planning and Review Process
(PARP). A Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)
was signed between Georgia and the European Union,
which went into force in 1999. The goals of integration
were reﬂected in ofﬁcial documents as well. For instance,
the document on “Basic Principles of the Sustainability of
Social Life, the Strengthening of State Sovereignty and Se-
curity and Restoration of Territorial Integrity of Georgia”
openly states Georgia's European orientation and the need
to integrate into its structures (Jones, 2004, p. 98). In the
document from 2000, Georgia's foreign policy goal is stated
K. Kakachia, S. Minesashvili / Journal of Eurasian Studies 6 (2015) 171e180 175as “to achieve full integration into European political, eco-
nomic, and security structures, thus fulﬁlling the historical
aspiration of the Georgian nation to participate fully in the
European community…” (Georgia and the World: A Vision
and Strategy for the Future, 2000).
Consequently, balancing Russian power, seen as primary
for Georgia's security, has constituted a major goal of
Georgia's foreign policy since 1994. For Georgia, aligning
with the western powers and membership in their struc-
tures such as NATO and EU represent a means of achieving
security, but this goal also arises from the Georgian social
order. Georgian foreign policy in the 1990s reﬂected both
the country's values and the country's aspiration towards
establishing a western model of governance. Therefore,
despite the fact that Georgia's foreign policy remained
mainly reactive and hesitant during the 1990s (Jones,
2004), the general orientation of Georgian foreign policy
remained constant, not only during the period since 1991
(Jones, 2004), but also during the period of the ﬁrst inde-
pendent Georgian republic in 1918e21 (Nodia, 2010).
Western identity is key to this (Jones, 2004; Nodia, 2010)
implying that the West is a model for Georgia's develop-
ment as a democracy as well as being the country's major
ally and protector (Nodia, 2010, p. 94). However, despite
this western identity, at least in the ﬁrst half of the 1990s,
considering the reactive character of foreign policy, it was
only after the Rose Revolution that Georgia's foreign policy
orientation became starkly deﬁned in terms of joining the
West and this was rationalized by cultural afﬁliation.
After the Rose Revolution in November 2003, European
integration gainednewmomentumasGeorgia reclaimed its
place in Europe and correspondingly set NATO and EU
membership as major foreign policy goals. The Rose Revo-
lution was interpreted as “the masses upholding Georgia's
national dignity and democratic values” that implied re-
entry into Europe (Beachain & Coene, 2014, p. 930).
Indeed, in some aspects of political and economic life aswell
as democratization, Georgia signiﬁcantly outbid most of its
post-Soviet counterparts, particularly in termsof decreasing
corruption as well as becoming one of the fastest growing
economies in Souteastern Europe (Cornell, 2007; Fairbanks,
2004; Jawad, 2006; Mitchell, 2004, 2006; Wheatley, 2006).
Echoing the emerging political changes, Euro-Atlantic
integration was set out as the main foreign policy priority
(Foreign Policy Strategy 2006e2009; National Security
Concept, 2005; 2011). The National Security Concept of
Georgia, the basic document that explains Georgia's
fundamental national values and interests which was
adopted by parliament in July 2005, described Georgia as
“an integral part of the European political, economic and
cultural area, whose fundamental national values are
rooted in European values and traditions [and which] as-
pires to achieve full integration into Europe's political,
economic and security systems … and to return to its Eu-
ropean tradition and remain an integral part of Europe”
(National Security Concept, 2005). The Concept underlines
the aspiration of the people of Georgia to join the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European
Union (EU), and to contribute to the security of the Black
Sea region as a constituent part of the Euro-Atlantic secu-
rity system. Even though some inconsistenciesaccompanied the practical process of “Europeanization”
such as the adoption of the “Singapore model” for Georgia's
economic development, which to some extent contradicted
the Europeanmodel (DeWaal, 2011) or some shortcomings
in implementing EU requirements, overall, Georgia's
foreign policy remained unshakably pro-Western. This was
undertaken in parallel to the process of “othering” Russia.
Relations with Russia further deteriorated with the impo-
sition by Moscow of an economic embargo in 2006, the
deportation of Georgian migrants from Russia and an en-
ergy blockade. This process culminated in the August War
of 2008 between the two countries and Russia's recogni-
tion of the independence of Georgia's two breakaway re-
gions. An image of Russia was constructed in which it is an
evil power for which Georgia's existence as a sovereign
state is inherently unacceptable. Consequently, Russian
inﬂuence in Georgia was considered to be an important
obstacle to the European integration of the country espe-
cially considering the fact that the Russian political and
military class largely rejected Georgia's state-building
project as contradictory to Russia's national interests.
Georgia went through a major change after the 2012
parliamentary and 2013 presidential elections. The Geor-
gian Dream coalition replaced the Saakashvili-led United
National Movement and presented its slightly different
vision of foreign policy. The new government pursued a
policy of “normalization” with Russia, whilst maintaining
the main target of Euro-Atlantic integration. Integration
into the EU and NATO remained foreign policy priorities
(Civil.ge, 2013, February 11). Relations with the EU were
further advanced by the signing of an Association Agree-
ment on June 27 2014 that includes creating a Deep and
Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). The same rhetoric
of ‘belonging to Europe’ continued to feature in ofﬁcial
discourse. Though the agreement doesn't guarantee Geor-
gia's EU membership in foreseeable future, it recognized
the ambition and aspirations of Georgian people to one day
become a member of the European family (European
Commission, 2014, May 11). As Prime Minister of Georgia
Irakli Garibashvili stated at the signing ceremony of the
Association Agreement: “today Georgia is given a historic
chance to return to its natural environment, Europe, its
political, economic, social and cultural space” (Civil.ge,
2014, June 27). President Giorgi Margvelashvili also made
similar claims: “as an individual, a Georgian national is
European in terms of self-awareness and an integral part of
Western civilization by nature” (The President of Georgia,
2013). However, it should also be noted that the Georgian
Dream coalition is a rather eclectic one. Consisting a range
of different politicians including a former football star and
ofﬁcials from the government of former president She-
vardnadze, it lacks ideological unity. Therefore, even
though the major leaders share pro-western aspirations, it
is difﬁcult to generalize for the whole coalition.
Overall, since the second half of the 1990s, Georgia's
pro-western foreign policy has remained largely un-
changed which is rather unexplainable for material ap-
proaches. As Georgian scholar Alexander Rondeli (2001)
states “[Georgian] attempts to integrate their country into
European structures is often seen as strategic idealism,
which goes against all geopolitical arguments and even
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argues that Georgia could have easily chosen a different
course, therefore Georgia's choices are not “based on some
material necessity or strict logic” (p. 95). Despite the
pressure from Russia both in security and economic terms,
including the 2008 August War and the 2006 economic
embargo, Georgia did not resort to the systemic pressure to
bandwagon with Russia but instead steadily continued its
pro-western policy (Gvalia et al., 2013).
There are several alternative explanations that consider
material rather than ideational factors for Georgia'swestern
orientation. These include the economic beneﬁts ofwestern
integration, to balance Russia in the region (Jones, 2004, p.
102), elite legitimacy and the search for an external patron
(Beachain& Coene, 2014). These factors do objectively exist,
but purely material explanations fail to explain the full
picture. The theoretical framework does not exclude the
coexistence of both ideational and interest-based reasoning
for foreign policy decisions. Therefore, while it is true that
elites may see the West as a better source of potential eco-
nomic beneﬁts or legitimacy than Russia, this perception
may stem from their identity and from their view of the
West as a source of the freedom and democracy on which
their legitimacy depends. Moreover, the argument that
Georgia is attracted to the West as a balance against Russia
should be tempered by consideration of the extent towhich
the West has been willing to act as such a balance. Despite
signiﬁcant economic support since the 1990s and increasing
involvement in terms of training and expertise sharing,
military assistance from the West has been minimal.
Furthermore, Georgian membership of NATO (Kakachia,
2013b) and the EU is quite a long-term perspective and
may not be easily attainable in the near future.
So ideas and identity can go someway to explainingwhy
Georgia deﬁned the West as part of its “self”, whilst “oth-
ering” Russia. This is conditioned by how the West's social
order and Western institutional, ideological and economic
structures are perceived by political elites in Georgia in
relation to their own identity. As discussed above, from the
very beginning the political development of Georgia was
framed in a way that equated it to western integration.
5. Georgia-West ties: a compatibility of social orders
There are several ways inwhich Georgian political elites
justify their country's pro-western orientation that arise
from the perceived complementary nature of their social
orders. These attitudes stem from the perception held by
Georgian elites of the level of compatibility of their coun-
try's social order with that perceived to exist in theWest or
Russia.
This idea implies that Georgia's foreign policy choice is
intrinsically linked to its aspirations of developing a west-
ern state with liberal democracy, but also with its historical
context and cultural values. Georgia's self-perception as a
country distinguished within the region by its aspirations
for freedom and democracy was particularly spurred by the
Rose Revolution in November 2003, after which Georgia
was hailed as a “beacon of liberty” (The Guardian, 2005,
May 10). In his inauguration speech then President Saa-
kashvili stated:[The European] ﬂag is Georgia's ﬂag as well, as far as it
embodies our civilization, our culture, the essence of our
history and perspective, and our vision for the future of
Georgia…Georgia is not just a European country, but
one of themost ancient European countries…our steady
course is towards European integration. It is time
Europe ﬁnally saw and valued Georgia and took steps
toward us (Civil.ge, 2004, January 25).
A review of statements by other Georgian politicians
interviewed for this article reveals similar sentiments.
Often, respondents referred to Georgia's historical relations
with Europe, especially ancient Greece, to bolster Georgia's
Western identity: “Georgians are their [the ancient Greeks']
direct descendants, about a quarter of Greek myths actually
refer to Georgia” (MP, GD, personal communication, July 22,
2014). Christianity is also commonly cited as a basis of
Georgia's commonality with European civilization. So it is
said that Georgia's “constant drive towards the European,
Christian world” (Ofﬁcial from PM's ofﬁce, GD, personal
communication, July 30, 2014), means that until the
15th century, Georgia was part of a common European cul-
tural space through its relations with the Byzantine Empire
(Ofﬁcial from NSC, UNM; Ofﬁcial from MFA, UNM; Ofﬁcial
from MFA, GD; Ofﬁcial from PM's Ofﬁce, GD, personal
communications). However, the narrative continues, that
the country was forcibly disconnected from its natural cul-
tural space after the Turks conquered Constantinople.
Georgia's European aspirations were then unfulﬁlled until
Georgia regained its independence in 1918e21 and selected
the western model of development (Ofﬁcial from MFA,
UNM, July 1, 2014). But these relations are not described as
mere historical experience, but as an inherent part of the
formation of Georgia's identity and values. These politicians
underline twomajor “Georgianvalues” that unite themwith
democratic western civilization. These are individualism
(Ofﬁcial from MFA, UNM, personal communication, 5
September, 2014) and a love of freedom (MP; GD; Ofﬁcial
from NSC, GD; Ofﬁcial from Ministry of Euro-Atlantic Inte-
gration, GD; Ofﬁcial from Ministry of Reconciliation and
Civic Equality, GD, personal communications):“our values,
our aspirations, our inherent position is absolutely Euro-
pean as we, Georgians, love freedom, we cannot even
breathe without freedom” (Ofﬁcial from Ministry of Euro-
Atlantic Integration, GD, personal communication,
September 2, 2014). Correspondingly, the current develop-
ment of closer relations with the West is therefore charac-
terized as a “return to Europe”: “Georgia is returning to the
civilization to which it belongs” (Ofﬁcial from MFA, UNM,
personal communication, September 5, 2014).
With these aspirations and statements of identity,
Georgian political leaders associate themselves with a re-
gion enjoying prosperity and development (the West)
rather than with peripheral areas such as the post-Soviet
space. It is because of this that many Georgians believe
that the country's economic and security needs can only be
achieved through cooperation with the West, which is the
“most attractive political-economic model in the world”
(Diplomat from Georgian Mission to EU, UNM, personal
communication, 30 June, 2014). It is also often argued that
Georgian and Western societies share common ideas and
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through pro-western foreign policy: “integration into this
organization (NATO) implies more protection, but also
more integration with the countries whose values include
freedom, liberal democracy and personal autonomy. This is
beneﬁcial for our society, because you become amember of
this club and this affects how you will develop internally.
The same is the case for the EU, except maybe the security
element” (Ofﬁcial from MFA, UNM, personal communica-
tion, 5 September, 2014); “small states are lucky that it is
the US that became the most inﬂuential state in the world,
because the US is built on principles that are hopeful for
world democracy. […] The internal order of the US is the
best” (MP, GD, personal communication, July 8, 2014).
However, value afﬁnity is not merely based on an
emotional attachment to the West, but it is also linked with
perceived state interests. This argument is based on the idea
that complementary value systems lead to complementary
interests.Democracy is associatedwith stabilityandsecurity,
this iswhyofﬁcials have stated that “theworld order that the
US and the EU promote is fully in the interests of Georgia”
(Ofﬁcial from MIA, UNM, personal communication, July 1,
2014) and that theWest also cares about civilized neighbors
who can take care of themselves (MP from Committee on
European Integration, UNM, personal communication, June
19, 2014). Democracy is somethingwhichwestern states are
assumed to be promoting for their security: “In the
21st century, youcannotguaranteeyourpeaceonlyby taking
care of your borders. Your neighbors should also be stable
and democratic. These are the interests of the EU and US”
(Ofﬁcial from Ministry of Euro-Atlantic Integration, GD,
personal communication, September 2, 2014). Georgian po-
litical elites often tend to subscribe to common assumptions
of liberal theories of international relations like democratic
peace theory: “ifwe look at political slogans such as a united,
free and peaceful Europe, this expresses the perception of
security enjoyed by liberal democracies” (Ofﬁcial from
Ministry of Defense, UNM, personal communication, July 1,
2014). As this perception excludes the possibility of violence
towards other similar states, this excludes war between
democratic states (Diplomat to International Organizations,
UNM, personal communication, June 23, 2014).6. Russia as an “other” e incompatible social orders
An identity-based account also offers a comprehensive
understanding of the complexities of RussiaeGeorgia re-
lations. Perceiving itself as part of a greater Europe, Geor-
gia's political class e a group that sometimes acts on behalf
of the state e sees Georgia's path as utterly incompatible
with the Russian project. First of all, Russia is deﬁned as a
successor to the Soviet Union and its self-proclaimed
sphere of inﬂuence is considered as a danger to Georgia's
national security. Believing that Russia is a sui generis
phenomenon that cannot disassociate itself from its Eura-
sianist ideology and imperialist ambitions,8 they consider8 On various philosophical threads of Eurasianism see: Laruelle, M.
(2012). Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire. Johns Hopkins
University Press.their northern neighbor neither European nor attractive in
terms of its socio-economic model. As Russian expert
Fyodor Lukyanov (2012) observed, “Georgia has sought to
create a conceptual alternative to Russia by providing an
example of a complete and irreversible break of historical
and cultural ties with its powerful neighbor.” Georgia's
political class believes that Russia offers no compelling
vision of a revived Russian sphere of inﬂuence, even for its
own allies as it already lost the battle for innovation and
economic development, and is gradually becoming an
“industrial museum.” Georgia, some respondents argue,
should form partnerships with more progressive countries
and should be united to the core area of global develop-
ment (the West), not to peripheral areas (such as the CIS or
post- Soviet space). As this perception still prevails over the
sub-consciousness of Georgia's political elites, they believe
that Georgia should continue to cooperate with the West,
as other alternatives cannot satisfy Georgia's economic and
security needs.
This incompatibility with Russia is largely based on the
social orders, both real and aspirational, of each country.
Many Georgians view the GeorgiaeRussia conﬂict as value-
based, part of a broader value-based rivalry between the
West and Russia. Georgia's choice of European integration
inherently implies conﬂict with Russia. “There is a value
conﬂict between theWest and Russia and as we say that we
are European, therefore, we also have a value-conﬂict with
Russia” (MP, GD, personal communication, June 8, 2014).
But this perception of Russia goes beyond that country's
opposition to pro-western foreign policy and that is where
social orders come into play. As some respondents claim, it
is not that Russia is opposed to pro-western policy but it is
against building a western type of state and that is what
Georgia is doing (Ofﬁcial from NSC, GD; Deputy Minister,
GD, personal communications). Therefore, Russia's internal
order is assumed to be shaping its interests, but also
shaping Georgia's, because “partnership with a non-
democratic, corrupt country that does not share modern
values would be disastrous for a small state” (MP, GD,
personal communication, July 22, 2014).
Georgia is considered as perceiving security and safety
in the same way that the West does and again indicating
similar social orders. On the other hand Russia's aggressive
foreign policy and domestic order are discussed as inter-
twined: “Russia's revanchism requires authoritarianism at
home. If Russia was democracy, people would question its
foreign policy. Russia does not care about anyone's well-
being, however, individualism is a basic principle of lib-
eral democracy. Thus it is naturally impossible to have any
common interests with Russia” (Diplomat to international
organizations, UNM, personal communication, June 23,
2014). Respectively, there is little perceived advantage in
cooperating with the Kremlin as the Georgian political class
does not believe that there is a deal to be had with Russia.
Consequently, cooperation or partnership between Russia
and Georgia would be possible if Russia moved towards
democracy (MP from Defense and Security Committee GD,
personal communication, September 8, 2014). The same
idea is developed in the ofﬁcial documents as well
including National Security Concept from 2011
(MacFarlane, 2012). “If Russia saw itself as part of the
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easier. But nowRussia tries to create its own space” (Ofﬁcial
from NSC, UNM, personal communication, June 20, 2014).
“If we talk about political culture, when countries develop
the same way, their perceptions of threat and security also
resemble each other. Therefore, Georgia's perception of
security is similar to the West's. It is the opposite to Rus-
sia's, who has the most conﬂicts with states that are ori-
ented towards development” (Ofﬁcial from Ministry of
Defense, UNM, personal communication, July 1, 2014).
Europeanization is in a way “desovietization” for Geor-
gia. This is achieved by distancing the country from post-
Soviet groupings (like the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS),9 the Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO), the Customs Union and others) that are heavily
dominated byMoscow. Viewing Russia as a successor of the
Soviet empire, Georgian political elites view its attempts of
reintegration as a threat to national security. In some ways
“desovietization” became a nationwide mantra drawing
from an identity-based narrative (Kakachia, 2013a). Corre-
spondingly, the recent bipartisan resolution on “Basic Di-
rections of Georgia's Foreign Policy” excludes any “military,
political and customs alliance with a state that recognizes
Abkhazia and South Ossetia” and also states that Georgia
will not join international organizations that in their
essence contradict “the principles of the rule of law and
supremacy of human rights.” This rules out diplomatic re-
lations with Russia or Russia-led organizations in the re-
gion unless Russia ceases its occupation of Georgian
territories (Civil.ge, 2013, March 7). In fact, in congruence
with this position, polls also indicate that whilst the ma-
jority of Georgians support good relations with Russia, they
are unwilling to get involved in Russia-led integration
processes at the expense of Georgia's sovereignty (Navarro,
2013).
Georgia has also sought European belonging in
geographical terms. No longer willing to be identiﬁed
merely as a post-Soviet country or with the Caucasus, a
region of instability and fragmentation, Georgian elites
preferred to be labeled as a member of the Black Sea
community as a way to become afﬁliated with the rest of
Europe (Kulick & Yakobashvili, 2008). Indeed during
Saakashvili's presidency, in terms of regional cooperation,
the switch of focus from the South Caucasus to the Black
Sea region in ofﬁcial documents is one indicator of a trend
that has played a major role in Georgia's pro-western
drive (Kakhishvili, 2013). As regional cooperation within
the wider Black sea area was one of Georgias main foreign
policy priorities, Georgian political elites deﬁne them-
selves as belonging to the region in terms of shared values
and identify themselves as belonging to Eastern Europe,
southern Europe, the Black Sea region, or the Mediterra-
nean rather than the volatile South Caucasus. They argue
that the concept of a South Caucasus region is merely a9 Georgia was not part of CIS at the beginning, but as a result of civil
wars it was forced to join the CIS in late 1993, and early the following
year, also to become a member of the CIS's Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO). In 1999, however, Georgia quit CSTO and after the
Russo-Georgian war in 2008 it quitted CIS.post-colonial legacy and thus it is considered to be an
artiﬁcial region “created by Tsarist and Soviet Russia for
their own geopolitical interests. As the South Caucasus as
a sub-region still remains without a proper “regional
identity,” it “cannot be viewed as a coherent region as
Caucasians have never distinguished themselves in this
way” (Ofﬁcial from NSC, UNM, personal communication,
June 6, 2014). Neither does the post-Soviet space exist in
terms of culture and civilization. In this sense, the “re-
gion” exists only for outside players (Diplomat from
Georgian Mission to EU, UNM, personal communication,
June 30, 2014).7. Conclusion
This paper was based on a theoretical framework that
views foreign policy as a reﬂection of the existence of
certain ideas and identities within a society and one in
which the process of constructing the “self” vis-a-vis an
“other” is an important component of foreign policy
formulation. Decision-makers' perception of the compati-
bility of the ideas and social order of their country and
those of external actors tend to impact how state interests
are deﬁned and provide guidelines for relevant behavior.
In the context from which Georgia's foreign policy
emerged, national identity has been correspondingly con-
structed in relation to these issues. Georgia's European
identity, which has come to hold a dominant position in
Georgian political discourse, has gradually emerged
throughout its history of constant occupation and division,
ﬁrst as a Christian state in contrast to Georgia's Muslim
neighbors and later as European. After disappointment
with Orthodox Russia, Georgia continued its quest for a
European future through direct relations with the West. In
this context, Russia and the Soviet Unionwere perceived as
barriers to this process. Since its declaration of indepen-
dence, while Georgian foreign policy evolved reactively,
direct links with Europe were consistently sought. But it
was only after the Rose Revolution that Georgia's pro-
western orientation was starkly deﬁned and ofﬁcially
justiﬁed with arguments of cultural belonging and through
the explicit deﬁnition of Russia as an existential threat.
This analysis has shown that the formulation of the
national interest and foreign policy of Georgia cannot be
discussed without reference to identity and social order
preferences within the state. Georgia's pro-western orien-
tation arises partly through the Georgian political elite's
idea of the country belonging in Europe by virtue of its
history, values and democratic aspirations. The type of so-
cial order is the central notion in this linkage. Georgian
elites also assume that theWest has an interest in Georgian
democratization and see a pro-western orientation as a tool
for internal development.
Russia is deﬁned as an “other” on the grounds of its
different social order and values. Consequently, conﬂict
with Georgia's northern neighbor is seen as a value-based
clash that could potentially be alleviated if Russia were to
switch to a democratic internal order. Georgia's effort to
break away from the post-Soviet space and the Russian
sphere of inﬂuence is related to its self-perception as a
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West vis-a-vis Russia's unattractive alternative model.
In sum, an identity-based account offers a better un-
derstanding of the construction and application of Geor-
gian foreign policy than a purely material interest-based
approach. The notion that Georgia belongs in “the West”
provides a certain foundation for Georgia's pro-western
orientation and its identity driven foreign policy. More-
over, this view allows us to forecast the future direction of
Georgia's foreign policy. However, it should not be
forgotten that consideration of Georgia's foreign policy
from the identity perspective is fraught with inevitable
risks as the country and its identity remains in ﬂux and is
therefore prone to change.Appendix 1. Respondent proﬁles.
# Position Afﬁliation Date of
interview




2 High-ranking ofﬁcial from
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MFA)
GD 03.06.14
3 MP from Committee on
European Integration (former)
UNM 19.06.14
4 High-ranking ofﬁcial from
National Security Council (NSC)
(former)
UNM 20.06.14




6 High-ranking diplomat from
Georgian mission to EU
(former)
UNM 30.06.14
7 High-ranking ofﬁcial from
Ministry of Internal Affairs
(MIA) (former)
UNM 01.07.14
8 High-ranking ofﬁcial from
Ministry of Defense (former)
UNM 01.07.14
9 Member of Parliament GD 08.07.14




11 High-ranking ofﬁcial from
Ministry for Reconciliation and
Civic Equality
GD 22.07.14
12 Member of Parliament GD 22.07.14
13 MP from Committee on
European Integration
GD 22.07.14
14 Member of Parliament GD 22.07.14
15 High-ranking ofﬁcial from PM's
Ofﬁce
GD 30.07.14
16 MP from Committee on
European Integration
UNM 27.08.14




18 High-ranking ofﬁcial from
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MFA) (former)
UNM 05.09.14
19 High-ranking ofﬁcial from
National Security Council (NSC)
GD 07.09.14
20 MP from Defense and Security
Committee
GD 08.09.14References
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